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WRESTLING WITH PUNISHMENT:

The Role of the BC Court of Appeal
in the Law of Sentencing

Gerry Fer guson and Benja min L. Ber ger1

INTRODUCTION

S

entencing is often portrayed, in the media, as a postscript
to the real stuff of criminal justice: the investigation and trial of
crime. To be sure, if one is looking for drama, it is most readily
found in the excitement of the investigative process or the stylized
thrust and parry of the adversarial criminal trial. Yet, as is the case in
so many areas of the law, it is the remedial dimension of the law – its
“business end” – that discloses most about its nature. It is in fact the law
of sentencing that provides the most direct window into the theories
and assumptions animating the criminal justice system as a whole.
Equipped with a broad range of forms and durations of punishment,
the sentencing judge is asked to craft a just and effective sanction. But
any assessment of the justice and efficacy of a sentence presumes an
orienting point by reference to which a judge can set his or her sentencing
compass. This orienting point depends upon social views about the
nature of individual responsibility and just and appropriate collective
responses to wrongdoing. As views on these matters shift, so too do
the practices of sentencing.
With this in mind, it is remarkable that sentencing has been and
continues to be a relatively “lawless” practice. Historically, little legislative guidance has been available to the sentencing judge on either the
aims and purposes of criminal punishment or the fit form and quantum
of punishment for given offences, apart from the comparatively few
instances in which Parliament has prescribed a minimum sentence. The
1995 amendments to the Criminal Code appear to speak to this absence of
guidance, listing the aims and principles that should guide sentencing;
but this list has amounted to just that – a kind of buffet of objectives
1
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and principles leaving sentencing judges in much the same position as
before the amendments, responsible for selecting one or more of these
objectives. In the end, the sentence in a given case turns overwhelmingly
on the theory of criminal justice adopted by the particular judge before
whom the accused finds him or herself.
This situation, combined with a strong tradition of giving a very large
measure of deference to the sentencing judge’s decision, has put courts
of appeal in a unique and important position. Bound by this principle
of deference but aware of the need to articulate some basic principles to
guide the practice of sentencing, courts of appeal have played an active
role in debating and expounding theories of crime and punishment by
which judges can set their sentencing compasses. As a result, in their
decisions on the appropriate ends and means of punishment, one finds
in appellate pronouncements a uniquely rich source in which to chart
shifting social views on the aims, purposes, and practices of sentencing.
This article looks at the role and the work of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal (bcca) in this area since the court was first given
jurisdiction to hear sentence appeals in 1921. In the three broad periods
that we canvass, we draw out the sometimes surprising, often unique,
and frequently provocative ways in which the bcca has, over its history,
wrestled with the practice of criminal punishment and, with it, the basic
assumptions of our system of criminal justice.
THE EARLY YEARS: 1921-49

Modest Guidance in Respect to Sentencing
As already stated, Parliament has traditionally provided very little
guidance to sentencing judges in their important task of imposing a fit
sentence. The sentencing framework under Canada’s first Criminal Code,
enacted in 1892, was pretty threadbare. It amounted to the following:
(1) capital punishment was restricted to nine offences; (2) a maximum
term of imprisonment was specified for all other offences; very few offences specified any mandatory minimum punishment; (3) fines were
separate stand-alone sanctions for minor offences or could also be added
as an additional sanction to terms of imprisonment; and (4) whipping
was available as an additional punishment to imprisonment for approximately ten serious offences. Apart from specifying the maximum
penalty, this legislative framework provided no real guidance to sentencing judges since (1) the Criminal Code did not set out a statement
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of either the aims and objectives of sentencing or the aggravating and
mitigating factors that should guide the determination of a fit sentence;
and (2) the maximum sentences that were specified in the Criminal
Code were generally set quite high to cover “the worst case scenario”
and therefore provided no guidance on the appropriate sanction for an
average, rather than extreme, example of the offence in question.
In short, sentencing was left to the unfettered discretion of the sentencing judge’s own philosophy and attitude towards sentencing. The
severity of a sentence depended more on who the judge was than on
the gravity of the offence and the circumstances and blameworthiness
of the offender.2 This potential for unwarranted sentencing disparity
was magnified by the fact that there was no right of appeal from the
sentence imposed by the trial judge until 1921.3 And even after sentence
appeals were established in 1921, appellate guidance and review in regard
to sentencing remained fairly limited for a number of reasons. First,
sentence appeals were relatively infrequent. In the first twenty-five years
after the initiation of sentence appeals, there were on average only two
reported sentencing appeal decisions per year from the bcca.4 Second,
those reported sentence appeal decisions were quite brief – on average
one page or less. Generally they confirmed or varied the sentence under
appeal with little or no explanation of the sentencing objectives, principles, and factors that justified their conclusion.
This relative lack of guidance in the bcca’s sentencing decisions can be
illustrated by reference to whipping cases. As already noted, the Criminal
Code indicated that whipping was a discretionary additional punishment
that the sentencing judge could impose in respect of a small number of
serious offences. Canada-wide statistics on whipping for the five year
period 1930-34 indicate that judges imposed whipping very selectively as
an additional punishment in 29 percent of rape convictions, 13 percent of
robbery convictions, and 4 percent of indecent assault convictions.5 Under
such circumstances, one might expect that clear guidance would and
should be given to sentencing judges by the Court of Appeal regarding
the criteria to be used in deciding whether to impose whipping. This
did not happen. In each of the four cases between 1925 and 1949, where
2
3

4
5

See J. Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).
See s. 1013(2) of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1921, c. 25 as amended by S.C. 1923, c. 41. Although
there was no general right to appeal a sentence until 1921, prior to that time a writ of error or
a writ of habeas corpus could be filed to challenge the legality of a sentence.
There may have been other unreported sentence appeals.
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, Final Report on Corporal
Punishment, Debates of the Senate 1956 (Hansard) at 872-85. The statistics in this report do
not include whipping for drug offences and armed burglary.
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the fitness of a sentence of whipping was under consideration, the bcca
summarily concluded that whipping was or was not a fit sentence without
any discussion of the criteria or general principles that judges should use
in deciding whether whipping was appropriate.
A third explanation for the lack of appellate guidance in sentencing
cases is the very deferential approach that the appeal court took to sentences imposed by trial judges. Although the Criminal Code indicated
that the Court of Appeal “shall consider the fitness of the sentence
appealed against,” that appeal function was narrowly construed. In
R. v. Zimmerman,6 the first bcca decision on sentencing, the court referred to and followed the practice in England and elsewhere in Canada
that an appeal court should not vary a sentence unless that sentence
applied a wrong principle or was clearly wrong in the sense that it was way
too harsh or way too lenient, considering all the circumstances. The fact
that the appeal judges were of the opinion that a different sentence would
have been preferable was not a sufficient reason to vary the sentence. The
limited scope for appellate review set out in Zimmerman was consistently
cited as the guiding principle in subsequent bcca sentencing cases.
Prevailing Sentencing Objectives: Retribution and Deterrence
Punishment is first and foremost associated with retribution. In legal
terms, retributive punishment is the deliberate infliction of pain, suffering, or deprivation on morally responsible offenders for their culpable
violation of criminal laws. It is the criminal justice system’s way of
righting the wrong. The sentencing cases decided by the bcca before 1949
make it clear that their decisions were governed by a sense of retribution
and the hope and expectation that the retributive punishment would
have a denunciatory and deterrent impact. The court’s decisions never
cited rehabilitation as a primary sentencing objective and mentioned it
only once in the late 1940s.7

6
7

(1925), 46 C.C.C. 78 (B.C.C.A.).
See R. v. Cruickshanks (1946), 63 B.C.R. 102 (C.A.).
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THE NEXT QUARTER CENTURY: 1950-75

A Modest Increase in Appellate Guidance
As the number of sentence appeals to the bcca increased in the third
quarter of the century, the court began to issue more detailed judgments
that set out some general principles and guidelines for sentencing. For
example, in R. v. Dupont, 8 the accused was convicted of armed robbery
for the second time and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment
and to be whipped with a paddle on two occasions with ten strokes
each time. He appealed against the whipping. The bcca quashed that
sentence and commented for the first time on the principles that should
govern whipping sentences. Wilson J.A., speaking for two of the three
appellate judges, referred to R. v. Childs,9 in which the Ontario Court
of Appeal criticized the backward and outdated nature of whipping and
held that judges should impose whipping only in very exceptional cases.
Wilson J.A. took exception to these remarks, arguing that Parliament,
not judges, should decide whether whipping should be discontinued and
that refusing to impose whipping because a judge found it personally
distasteful improperly usurped a legislative function. Second, he noted
that, in cases in which whipping was imposed as a suitable punishment,
the court might properly reduce the length of imprisonment that might
otherwise be imposed if whipping were not part of the sentence. Third,
in regard to the rationale for whipping, he stated:
With deference, I think that whipping is not to be decreed as a
measure of retribution, but only as a deterrent. Where the actions of
the prisoner have shown a callous and brutal disregard for the sufferings and indignities he has imposed upon other persons then it may
be that one way of bringing home to him what his victim has suffered
and thus deterring him, is to expose the prisoner to pain and indignity.
This I conceive to be at least part of what parliament had in mind in
authorizing judges to order whipping.10

Finally, on the facts of this case, he noted that the offender used no
brutality in his offence (in fact, he restrained brutality by his accomplice),
and there were no other features of the robbery that would justify the
addition of a sentence of whipping to an appropriately severe sentence
of seven years imprisonment.
8
9
10

(1962), 39 W.W.R. 217 (B.C.C.A.).
(1939), 71 C.C.C. 70 (Ont.C.A.).
(1962), 39 W.W.R. 217 (B.C.C.A.) at 223.
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The bcca’s decision in R. v. Hinch and Salanski11 in the late 1960s was
another example of the court’s setting out general objectives and principles of sentencing as guidance for subsequent cases. The two accused
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obtain money from BC Hydro by false
pretences. They agreed to pay kickbacks (approximately $20,000 over
an eight-month period) to a BC Hydro employee who threatened to
deny them further construction contracts unless they did so. The two
accused were experienced businessmen with no prior criminal records
and were well respected in their small-town communities. The trial
judge characterized the two accused as victims of the unscrupulous BC
Hydro employee and imposed one-month imprisonment and a $2,000
fine on each of them. Measured against existing precedents, these were
very lenient sentences. The Crown appealed. Somewhat surprisingly,
a majority of the bcca held that the trial judge had not made an error
in principle and that the sentences were not so low as to warrant the
interference of the court.12 In the course of its judgment, the majority
specified the objectives of sentencing as (1) the safety of the public;
(2) the deterrent effect of a sentence; (3) punishment of the offender; and
(4) reformation and rehabilitation of the offender. However, the court did
not indicate how a trial judge should determine which objective(s) should
be given priority. The court also waded into the debate over whether
retribution and vengeance are appropriate sentencing objectives, stating
that “retribution” is too easily confused with vengeance, which involves
a loss of objectivity, and concluding that the word “retribution” “is misleading and is to be deprecated.”13 The court also listed seven factors to
be taken into account in reviewing the fitness of a sentence.14

11
12

13
14

[1968] 3 C.C.C. 39 (B.C.C.A.).
The dissenting judge, Robertson J.A., held that the trial judge did err in treating the two
accused as hapless victims, that a one-month sentence was a wholly inadequate deterrent
to others, and that any sentence of less than eighteen months would not be an adequate
deterrent.
Hinch, supra note 11 at 55.
Ibid. at 44-45, where the majority stated “the following factors are among those to be considered
by this Court in reviewing the sentences: (1) The degree of premeditation involved; (2) The
circumstances surrounding the actual commission of the offence; (3) The gravity of the crime
committed in regard to which the maximum punishment provided by statute is an indication;
(4) The attitude of the offender after the commission of the crime as this serves to indicate
the degree of criminality involved and throws some light on the character of the participant;
(5) The previous criminal record, if any, of the offender; (6) The age, mode of life, character
and personality of the offender; (7) Any recommendation of the trial Judge, any pre-sentence
or probation officer’s report, or any mitigating or other circumstances properly brought to
the attention of this Court.”
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Finally, R. v. Switlishoff 15 is a remarkable illustration of both appellate deference and of the bcca’s willingness to forego long sentences
of imprisonment on the theory that they may sometimes do more harm
than good. In this case, six Sons of Freedom Doukhobors were convicted
of three serious acts of arson arising out of a clash of ideology with the
mainstream Doukhobor community. The sentencing judge, Manson J.,
widely viewed as particularly severe in matters of sentencing, imposed
remarkably lenient sentences on the offenders, ranging from one day
to three months. He noted that the offenders were repentant and had
promised they would not repeat these offences and that severe sentences
imposed on radical Doukhobors in the past had failed to deter them and
engendered a sense of grievance. He held that leniency had a real chance
of accomplishing what severity had not in the past. The Crown appealed
and the majority of the bcca upheld these sentences. O’Halloran J.A.,
for the majority, after referring to the principle of appellate deference in
Zimmerman, stated:
Were the sentences adequate? That depends upon all the surrounding
circumstances. There is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a
particular crime. No doubt in somewhat similar circumstances it is
desirable to avoid marked disparity in sentences. But the individual
himself and his surrounding conditions cannot be ignored …16
The Doukhobors have been a problem. They have been dealt with
severely in the past, both in large and small groups, for failure to
obey Canadian laws. The Piers Island temporary penitentiary was
an outstanding example, when hundreds of them were incarcerated.
But severe sentences have neither reformed them nor deterred them.
Manson J. became convinced that leniency might accomplish what
severity failed to do in the past. He believes by reason of what he has
seen and heard as the assize judge that, outside some “outlaws,” the
Doukhobors may now be responsive to leniency. He may be right or he
may be wrong but this Court plainly cannot say he is one or the other.
If he is right posterity may acclaim him as a great judge, far-seeing
beyond his generation. If he is wrong, he cannot be much more wrong
than many other capable judges and administrators in the past who
have relied on severity that has failed in its purpose.17
15
16
17

(1950), 97 C.C.C. 132 (B.C.C.A.).
Ibid. at 136.
Ibid. at 138. It is interesting to note that Justice O’Halloran seems to lump all Doukhobors
together in his assessment of the issues, a common perspective among non-Doukhobors of
the time.
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In so ruling the bcca both underscored the principle of appellate
deference to sentencing decisions and resounded a note of scepticism
about the efficacy of long sentences of incarceration.
The Emergence of Rehabilitation as a
Correctional and Sentencing Objective
During this period, rehabilitation emerged gradually as a significant
objective, first in correctional policy and then in sentencing. By the 1950s,
there had been a significant shift in correctional policy:18 imprisonment
was no longer viewed solely as punishment; it should include as much
as possible rehabilitation, which, in turn, necessitated a transformation
in prison programming and expertise. New “reform” institutions were
established in British Columbia, including New Haven, the Young Offenders Unit at Oakalla Prison, and, later, the Haney Correctional Institution. These reform institutions were modelled on the British “borstal”
system, which provided intensive programs of education, training,
and instruction for young offenders in specially created correctional
institutions with the overriding objective of rehabilitating these youths.
There was optimism that rehabilitation, especially of young offenders
and first offenders, could occur in these specialized prison programs.19
This shift towards rehabilitation in correctional policy was accompanied
by two important legislative changes that allowed judges to take a more
rehabilitative approach to sentencing: (1) the enactment of a Probation
Act for British Columbia and (2) the creation of indeterminate sentences
for young offenders in British Columbia.
Increased Use of Suspended Sentences and Probation
In 1946, British Columbia enacted a Probation Act, which put in place
the beginnings of a probation service staffed by professional probation
officers who could supervise offenders in the community.20 Probation
quickly became a popular sentencing option for trial judges and the bcca
18

19

20

This shift in correctional policy is set out in detail in D. Doherty and J. Ekstedt, Conflict, Care
and Control: The History of the Corrections Branch in British Columbia (Vancouver: Institute for
Studies in Criminal Justice Policy, Simon Fraser University, 1991).
By 1958, New Haven was claiming a rehabilitation rate of 80 percent for the more than five
hundred young offenders treated there during the past ten years. By 1962-63, these success
rates were downgraded to 62 percent for New Haven, 64 percent for Haney, and 70 percent
for Gold Creek Forestry Camp. Success was measured by the narrow criterion that the young
offender had not re-entered the correctional system for at least one year after his or her release.
See Doherty and Ekstedt, Conflict at 92-93 and 102.
Probation Act, S.B.C. 1946, c. 60.
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supported the use of probation for rehabilitative purposes. For example, in
R. v. Allen,21 the trial judge imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment
on the offender for three counts of indecent assault on young girls. The
bcca, on the advice of a psychiatric expert who indicated that the offender
would not benefit from imprisonment, quashed the prison sentence and
placed the offender on probation for two years, with the requirement that
he attend the Crease Clinic for psychotherapy. And in R. v. Bludoff,22
the offender was convicted of stealing gas over a two-year period to a
value of more than $20,000. Notwithstanding that this type of offence
would normally result in a prison sentence, the magistrate imposed a
suspended sentence and probation and the bcca upheld that sentence,
applying its normal deferential approach. However, the bcca made it
clear that a suspended sentence and probation was not acceptable in those
cases in which a court decided that general deterrence was the primary
sentencing objective. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
bcca attempted to stamp out the rapid increase in marijuana use among
young people by imposing harsh sentences designed to deter both the
offender and others. In R. v. Budd,23 R. v. Hartley and McCallum,24 and
R. v. Adelman, 25 the bcca indicated that sentences of six months
imprisonment should be imposed on the offenders, all of whom were
college students and first time offenders. For example, although the
sentencing judge had imposed a suspended sentence on Adelman (who
had a master’s degree and was studying for another), the bcca overturned that sentence. In its view, the primary purpose of sentencing was
to control the incidence of crime through punishment and this could
be accomplished by deterring others and rehabilitating the offender.
However, the court held that rehabilitation was a secondary objective
in circumstances where severe sentences are necessary to bring a rapidly
increasing offence under control. Notwithstanding their concern for the
adverse consequences of sending these young offenders to jail, the court
held that sentencing judges could not allow a criminal law to be broken
frequently with impunity. Obviously, the court considered the use of
fines and probation in such cases as virtually equivalent to impunity.26

21
22
23
24
25
26

(1954), 108 C.C.C. 239 (B.C.C.A.).
(1960), 129 C.C.C. 264 (B.C.C.A.).
Unreported, B.C.C.A. January 15, 1965.
(1968), 63 W.W.R. 174 (B.C.C.A.).
(1968), 63 W.W.R. 294 (B.C.C.A.).
The court did leave open the possibility that there might be exceptional cases where probation
could be a fit sentence for possession of marijuana.
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Adelman set the standard for imposition of jail sentences on first time offenders for simple possession of marijuana for the next several years.27
Indeterminate Sentences
To facilitate rehabilitation of young adult offenders, the BC government
requested that the federal government amend the Prisons and Reformatories Act to authorize the use of indeterminate sentences for young offenders in British Columbia. The new provision, enacted in 1948,28 gave
BC judges the power to sentence male persons aged sixteen to twenty-two
to a definite term of imprisonment between three months and two years
less a day and an additional indeterminate period thereafter of not more
than two years less a day to be served “in New Haven, instead of the
common gaol.”29 The new provisions under the Prisons and Reformatories
Act also created a BC Parole Board, which was authorized to release
the young offender on parole at the optimum rehabilitative moment
during the indeterminate portion of his sentence. And the New Haven
Act 30 specified that the newly created institution called New Haven
should be for the custody and detention of young persons “with a view
to their education, training, and reclamation.” As the court noted in
R. v. Adams,31 the rehabilitative purposes of the new provisions were
clear. They were designed “to provide a means of segregation of certain
youthful offenders from hardened criminals, and of making every effort to
reclaim such offenders from a life of crime by methods which could only
succeed in the most favourable surroundings set apart from a crowded
prison such as Oakalla.”32 Likewise the court in R. v. Moss indicated that

27

28

29

30
31
32

In R. v. Bruckshaw, (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 133 (B.C.C.A.), where the accused had bought an
ounce of hash and cut it into smaller pieces for his own use and also to sell a couple of pieces
to his friends, Robertson J.A., concurred in by Nemetz and Branca JJ.A., stated: “It goes
against the grain to send an otherwise nice boy to prison, where he must come in contact
with persons of the most undesirable kind. But the quantity of a narcotic that a nice boy sells
does just as much harm to its user as the same quantity sold by a depraved adult, and it is the
potential users of drugs that the Court’s policy is primarily directed to protecting” (137).
Prisons and Reformatories Act, RSC 1927, c. 165, amended by S.C. 1948, c. 26, which added ss.
147A to 147C. Ontario was the only other province that had a determinate/indeterminate
sentencing scheme.
The Prisons and Reformatories Act was subsequently amended in 1951 to authorize indeterminate
sentences to be served in the Young Offenders Unit at Oakalla and in 1958 to be also served
at the Haney Correctional Institute.
Stats. B.C. 1949, c. 45.
(1950), 98 C.C.C. 53 (B.C.S.C.).
Reference Re Adams, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 614 at 617 (B.C.S.C.).
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the new provisions were “directed to a special object, viz., the efficient
administration of the Borstal system in British Columbia.”33
It is apparent from reading the cases that some judges, in order
to provide correctional authorities with adequate time to carry out a
program of rehabilitation, were imposing longer determinate/indeterminate sentences under the Prisons and Reformatories Act than they
would have done had the offender been sentenced under the general
sentencing laws.34 The longer sentences were considered appropriate since
rehabilitation was seen to be in the best interests of both the offender and
society and because there was an expectation that parole would normally
be granted for a portion of the indeterminate sentence. Interestingly, in
R. v. Holden,35 the bcca stated that it is “quite wrong” to impose longer
sentences on adult offenders solely for rehabilitative purposes, leaving it to
the Parole Board to release such offenders at the optimum rehabilitative
point in their sentences. The court stated that “no greater sentence should
be imposed than the nature of the offence requires when it is considered
in the light of the attendant circumstances and established principles.”36
However, the court expressly stated that its comments in this regard did
not apply to determinate/indeterminate sentences on young offenders
under the Prisons and Reformatories Act.
As time passed, the conflict between the principle of proportionality
and the practice of imposing longer sentences for rehabilitative
purposes under the Prisons and Reformatories Act came to a head. In
R. v. Turcotte,37 the offender was sentenced to a definite term of eighteen
months imprisonment plus an indeterminate term of two years plus a
day. But the maximum punishment for the offence in question under
the statute creating the offence was only eighteen months. By reliance
on the Prisons and Reformatories Act, the trial judge had sentenced the
offender to two years longer than the maximum sentence prescribed for
that offence. A majority of the bcca held that such an application of
the Prisons and Reformatories Act was contrary to the legislative intent
of the Act. Surprisingly, a five to four majority of the Supreme Court of
33
34

35
36
37

R. v. Moss (1951), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 688 at 689 (B.C.C.A.).
See, for example, R. v. Moss, ibid., where the Court of Appeal altered an eighteen-month
definite sentence in Oakalla to a six-month determinate sentence and a two-year-less-one-day
indeterminate sentence in New Haven. Conversely, where the Court of Appeal was of the
view that the trial judge overemphasized deterrence and retribution and gave insufficient
consideration to reformation, it reduced an aggregate sentence of six years imprisonment to
a sentence of twelve months definite and twelve months indeterminate. See R. v. Courtney
(1956), 115 C.C.C. 260 (B.C.C.A.).
[1963] 2 C.C.C. 394 (B.C.C.A.).
Ibid. at 396-97.
(1969), 69 W.W.R. 705 (B.C.C.A.), reversed [1970] S.C.R. 843.
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Canada (scc) overturned the Court of Appeal and held that the interpretation placed on the Prisons and Reformatories Act by the sentencing judge
was correct. Thus young offenders, in the name of rehabilitation, could
be sentenced to longer maximum sentences than adult offenders.
Four years later the same issue was before the courts in R. v. Burnshine.38 This time the offender argued that the imposition of a determinate/indeterminate sentence under the Prisons and Reformatories Act
that was longer than the maximum sentence set out in the statute creating
that offence and that only applied to male persons in British Columbia
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two was a violation of equality
before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. A majority of the
bcca agreed with that submission and held that the determinate/indeterminate provision of the Prisons and Reformatories Act was inoperative. The
majority held that treating offenders in British Columbia under the age of
twenty-two more harshly than similar offenders in other parts of Canada
was indeed a denial of equality under the law. Once again, on further
appeal, a six to three majority of the scc set aside the bcca’s progressive
judgment and held that there was no infringement of the offender’s right
to equality before the law. The majority of the Supreme Court, in effect,
justified its amazing conclusion on the basis that the young offenders in
question were not being treated “more harshly” since the determinate/
indeterminate provisions under the Prisons and Reformatories Act were
enacted for legitimate rehabilitative purposes.
Soon after the bcca issued its judgment in Burnshine declaring that
determinate/indeterminate sentences were a violation of the Bill of Rights,
the new ndp provincial government’s interest in these types of sentences
waned, and it was not revived when the scc declared, a year later, that
those sentences were indeed legal. Instead, in 1975, the BC government
closed Haney Correctional Institution, and Parliament formally
abolished determinate/indeterminate sentences in 1978. The closing of
Haney marked a shift in the government’s penal policy reflecting the
view that rehabilitation could be achieved more effectively through
community-based, rather than jail-based, programs. The government
believed that these community-based programs could be implemented
by greater use of temporary absence programs, parole, halfway houses,
probation, and community service orders.39
38

39

(1973), 22 C.R.N.S. 271 (B.C.C.A.), reversed (1974), 25 C.R.N.S. 270 (S.C.C.). For a critique
of the scc decision, see W. Conklin and G. Ferguson, “The Burnshine Affair: Whatever
Happened to Drybones and Equality before the Law?” Chitty’s Law Journal 22 (1974): 303-13.
Doherty and Ekstedt, supra note 18 at 137-39.
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MODERN TIMES: 1975 TO THE PRESENT

The Sentencing Role of Appellate Courts
The number of sentencing appeals coming before the bcca continued
to increase rapidly during this most recent period. Yet matching this
trend in increased workload on sentencing matters was an equally robust
and continuing trend in favour of significant appellate deference on
sentence appeals. Although some appellate courts were becoming more
interventionist in the 1970s and 1980s,40 the scc strongly reasserted, in a
series of cases in the 1990s and thereafter, that appellate courts must pay
great deference to the sentencing judge’s choice of sentence.41
This combination of a marked increase in the number of appeals and
great appellate deference towards the sentences meted out by sentencing
judges meant that the chief influence of appellate courts was in the
broad articulation of principles and objectives that ought to guide sentencing judges. Indeed, until 1995 when Parliament passed Bill C-41,42
which added new sections to the Criminal Code outlining the objectives,
purposes, and principles of sentencing, appellate courts were the key
source of legal guidance on the ends that we purport to seek with the
imposition of criminal sanctions. And since the scc seldom entertained
sentence appeals on the sole issue of the fitness of a given sentence,43
provincial appellate courts were in most instances courts of last resort on
issues of sentencing. Not surprisingly, these appellate courts frequently
held very divergent opinions on the approach that one should take to
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criminal sentencing. During this period, appellate courts were also acting
in an environment in which there was vigorous public, governmental,
and academic discussion on how to navigate and balance the divergent
philosophies of punishment variously at play in the system. The Law
Commission of Canada and other legal reform institutions were, in the
1970s and thereafter, actively engaged in researching and suggesting
sentencing models.44 The appellate judgments of this time were, thus,
engaging with this energetic body of debate and reform literature, not
least of which was the 1987 Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, chaired by Judge Archambault.45
In this context, appellate courts attempted to balance and reconcile
the two broad constellations of principles outlined thus far in this article:
(1) the traditional model of deterrence- and retribution-based sentencing
predominant in the early years and (2) the ethic of rehabilitation that,
although unsuccessful in the particular form that it first took in British
Columbia, was nevertheless very much still in the air in the late 1970s
and beyond. Needless to say, the bcca decided many important technical
points of sentencing law in this period. However, it is on these broader
philosophical questions – questions about the orientation of the system
of punishment as a whole – that the bcca adopted unique and important
positions in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Some of these
cases reflect the shape that our modern law has ultimately taken, whereas
others now stand out as marking sentencing roads not taken.
The BC Court of Appeal on the Objectives of Sentencing
The 1995 amendments to the Criminal Code came after many years in
which appellate courts wrestled with and developed their own approach
to the objectives of criminal punishment. The period between the mid1970s and 1995 was a particularly active time for the bcca in coming to
terms with the various – and often competing – objectives of sentencing.
Here, we focus upon four key contributions of the court to the debate
about the aims and purposes of sentencing in the time leading up to
and immediately following the 1995 amendments.
44

45

For a summary of the various reports and bodies engaged in assessing the sentencing system in
Canada, see Gerry Ferguson, “From Jeremy Bentham to Anne McLellan: Lessons on Criminal
Law Codification,” in Don Stuart, Ronald J. Delisle, and Allan Manson, eds., Towards a
Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1999)
192 at 208-10.
Canadian Sentencing Commission (Archambault Commission), Sentencing Reform:
A Canadian Approach (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1987).

Wrestling with Punishment

39

Questioning Deterrence
As already discussed, retribution and the notion of specific and general
deterrence was the backbone of sentencing law in the early years of the
bcca’s work. In the late 1970s, however, one finds the bcca struggling
with and questioning the utility of deterrence as an objective of criminal
punishment. Consider, for example, the 1977 case of R. v. Harrison and
Garrison.46 The accused were convicted of robbery and given suspended
sentences that included two hundred hours of community service. The
Crown appealed, conceding that the accused had themselves learned their
lesson but arguing that the principle of general deterrence – discouraging
others from committing similar crimes – mandated an increase in
sentence. In the course of dismissing the Crown appeal, Chief Justice
Farris offered provocative remarks on the nature of general deterrence.
Referring to and adopting comments that he made on another occasion,
Farris C.J.B.C. expressed the view that “general deterrence is a byproduct of the whole system of justice and not necessarily an aim of any
particular sentence.”47 Rather than emphasising the severity of individual
punishment, Chief Justice Farris reasoned – wisely, in our view – that
“[p]revention follows from awareness of the system and of the efficiency
of its operation,”48 appealing to the reason of some and to the fear of
others, thus creating a deterrent effect. As a result, “[t]he effectiveness
of the principle of general deterrence (such as it is) is not diminished by
refusing to imprison a person who should not be imprisoned.”49
This critical stance towards deterrence is somewhat remarkable viewed
from within the current political climate in which so much criminal
justice policy is driven by the assumed efficacy and predominance of
this objective. Yet it is a view supported by much social-scientific literature that suggests that the likelihood of being caught is a far more
effective route to deterrence than severity of punishment, which has
marginal effect at best. Chief Justice Farris’s decision, thus, offered
the possibility of marginalizing a heavily invoked but dubious aspect
of our sentencing system. Unfortunately, the impact of this decision
would be short-lived. In the 1981 case of R. v. Campbell,50 and “[a]fter
anxious reflection,” Chief Justice Nemetz expressly overruled Harrison,
stating that it “should no longer be followed.”51 Indeed, he stated that
46
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“where a serious offence involving violent crime has been committed …
deterrence to others is not only an important factor in sentencing but
should be the prime consideration taken into account.”52 Chief Justice
Nemetz substituted a period of incarceration for the suspended sentence
imposed by the sentencing judge. Although the court would later clarify
that the decision in Campbell did not mean that imprisonment was the
only means of achieving general deterrence,53 it also confirmed the idea
that deterrence is not only still a key objective of criminal punishment
in British Columbia but also the prime consideration in serious offences.54
In R. v. Mulvahill 55 the court explained that, “[a]lthough thoughtful
questions have been raised from time to time as to whether sentences
imposed for some crimes do in fact deter others,” pursuing deterrence
by means of a severe sentence was appropriate for serious crimes and for
those in which “there is a high degree of planning and pre-meditation,
and where the offence and its consequences are highly publicized.”56
In 1992, the bcca decided the case of R. v. Sweeney,57 which it viewed
as an important opportunity to undertake a full re-examination of the
objectives and principles governing criminal sentencing in the province.
To facilitate the free reassessment of sentencing law and theory, the court
sat as a panel of five, which gave it the liberty to depart from past rulings.58
Justice Wood issued separate reasons concurred in by Chief Justice
McEachern. These concurring reasons are remarkable inasmuch as they
offer a clear and systematic assessment of the purposes and objectives of
sentencing, drawing heavily from the report of the Canadian Sentencing
Commission, three years before the introduction of Bill C-41.
Interestingly, Wood J.A. expressed deep scepticism about the theory
of general deterrence. In this respect, his position was more radical than
that of the Commission, which had cautiously accepted deterrence as
a sentencing objective. “The problem with the theory,” Wood J.A. explained, “lies in its extension to the conclusion, which I believe has been
too easily accepted in the past, that the greater the sanction imposed in
any given case, the greater will be its general deterrent effect.”59 Justice
Wood, very much echoing Chief Justice Farris’s concerns articulated
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in 1977, cites “an increasingly persuasive body of evidence and learned
opinion” against the general deterrent effect. Yet it remains a substantial
component of our modern law and politics of sentencing, and the scc has
itself adopted a formula very much similar to that enunciated in Campbell,
giving a privileged position to deterrence in cases of serious crime.
Wrestling with Denunciation
Chief Justice Farris commented in Harrison that it is “the moral sense
of the community which substantially achieves the objective of the
prevention of crime.”60 Interestingly, despite his difference with Farris
C.J.B.C. on the deterrence point, in his separate concurring reasons in
Campbell, Justice Taggart similarly endorsed the notion that “a sentence is
imposed because it reflects the revulsion of society against the particular
offence.”61 What is the role of “the moral sense of the community” and
“revulsion” for particular acts in a just sentencing regime? The bcca has
wrestled with this issue as a matter of the appropriate role of denunciation
as an aim of the law of sentencing.
In this period of substantial debate about the purposes of sentencing,
the morally communicative aspect of criminal sentences was endorsed
early by Chief Justice Farris in the 1977 case of R. v. Oliver.62 The case
involved a lawyer who was convicted of misappropriating over $300,000
from trust funds. He was given a ninety-day sentence to be served intermittently (i.e., on weekends). The Crown appealed, arguing that this
sentence was unfit. Chief Justice Farris agreed and imposed a sentence
of four years incarceration. The principal justification for this radical
increase in the severity of the sentence was the objective of denunciation,
the sense of revulsion felt by the community at the breach of the moral
standards of the criminal law. He explained as follows:
Courts do not impose sentences in response to public clamour, nor in
a spirit of revenge. On the other hand, justice is not administered in
a vacuum. Sentences imposed by courts for criminal conduct by and
large must have the support of concerned and thinking citizens. If they
do not have such support, the system will fail. There are cases, as Lord
Denning has said, where the punishment inflicted for grave crimes
should reflect the revulsion felt by the majority of citizens for them.
In his view, the objects of punishment are not simply deterrent or
60
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reformative. The ultimate justification of punishment is the emphatic
denunciation by the community of a crime. 63

Chief Justice Farris’s acceptance of denunciation while putting into
question deterrence points to an important fault line in the theory of
sentencing. One may reject a utilitarian approach to sentencing while
strongly embracing a morally expressivist sense of the ends of criminal
punishment.
Yet, while accepting denunciation as a legitimate aspect of criminal
sentencing, the bcca has reflected a certain caution about heavy reliance
upon it. In R. v. Pettigrew, 64 the court was faced with the case of an
alcoholic woman who, while drunk and attempting to remove bullets
from a firearm, killed the man with whom she was living. She was
convicted of manslaughter and the sentencing judge imposed a one-year
custodial sentence, noting that “courts have to mark the taking of a life
in a way that’s significant to members of society”.65 Ms. Pettigrew appealed, arguing that imprisonment solely for the purposes of denunciation
was unwarranted. Justice Taylor, writing for the majority of the court,
conceded that denunciation, or punishment “as expression or reflection of
society’s ‘abhorrence at,’ or ‘rejection of,’ the conduct of the offender”66 is
a legitimate part of the sentencing process. Yet Justice Taylor emphasized
that denunciation must be assessed in the context of the given case and
that a sentencing judge must consider any adverse effects that a denunciatory sentence might have on the rehabilitation of the offender. Faced
with a Métis offender with no prior criminal record and afflicted with
alcoholism, Justice Taylor concluded that “a sentence based wholly on
‘denunciation,’ ‘rejection’ or ‘abhorrence,’” was, in his view, “difficult to
justify.”67 He allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence.
In Sweeney, Justice Wood confirmed this cautious approach to the
use of denunciation as a justification for punishment. He argued that
denunciation was but a mechanism to achieve what he, along with the
Canadian Sentencing Commission, concluded was the fundamental
purpose of sentencing: proportionality between the gravity of the offence
and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as measured by “the moral
culpability of the offender’s conduct.”68 As such, “denunciation, as a goal
of sentencing, must be strictly limited to ensuring that sentences imposed
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for criminal convictions are proportionate to the moral culpability of the
offender’s unlawful act.”69 Why this deep caution around the objective
of denunciation, a caution not frequently detected in contemporary
sentencing law? The answer is found in Justice Wood’s recognition that
denunciation is an objective “associated with the retributive theory of
sentencing”70 and in the bcca’s unique and fascinating debate on the
legitimacy of retribution in our system of criminal punishment.
What Role for Retribution?
In the 1968 case of R. v. Hinch and Salanski,71 discussed above, the bcca
took a strong position against the legitimate place of “retribution” in
a modern system of criminal punishment. In that case, Justice Norris
reasoned that “the use of the term ‘retribution’ as a factor in sentencing
is misleading and is to be deprecated”72 as it reflected a sense of societal
vengeance meted out against an offender and a concomitant loss of
objectivity “not in accord with the present-day concept of the purposes
of the criminal law.”73
Yet to accept, as the court did from the late 1970s into the 1990s, the
idea that denunciation – or the expression of abhorrence or revulsion of
society at the breach of its moral code – has a legitimate role to play in a
just system of criminal punishment but to reject the idea of the infliction
of punishment for retributive purposes is a fine jurisprudential line to
walk. Thus, by the early 1990s, and no doubt precipitated by its various
decisions endorsing the concept of denunciation, the bcca was faced
with a series of cases that put the hard question of whether retribution
was, indeed, a legitimate aspect of the sentencing process.
One finds in the cases at this time a rich discussion surrounding
the concept of retribution. On the one hand, in certain cases the court
seems to take the position that “retribution” is merely an old and perhaps
outdated term used to designate the legitimate end of denunciation. This
is the view of Taylor J.A. in Pettigrew, who wrote that denunciation,
69

70
71
72
73

Ibid. at 103 (emphasis added). See also R. v. Hicks (1995), 56 B.C.A.C. 259, in which Lambert
J.A. explained that the overriding principle of sentencing must be “that the sentence must
be commensurate with the gravity of the offence” (para. 13) and that denunciation is only
“a proper factor to consider and apply in order to lead to a sentence that is consistent with
the overriding principle that the sentence must be commensurate with the gravity of the
offence” (para. 14).
Sweeney, supra note 57 at 103.
[1968] 3 C.C.C. 39 (B.C.C.A.).
Ibid. at 44.
Ibid.

44

bc studies

a legitimate factor in the sentencing process, is simply “not spoken of
today as ‘retribution,’”74 but it still captures the idea of the infliction of
a penalty in response to society’s “abhorrence at” or “rejection of ” the
conduct of the offender. In a later case, R. v. Eneas,75 Justice Southin,
writing a majority opinion from which Wood J.A. dissented, voiced even
more explicit support for the legitimate role of retribution in sentencing,
arguing that the key distinction is that between “retribution,” which is an
aspect of sentencing, and “revenge,” which is not. She described revenge
as “what the family of the victim wants for its own loss” and concluded
“of that the law takes no account.”76 By contrast, Southin J.A reasoned
that “retribution is what society demands as an expression of its own
moral code”77 and is, thus, essential to the criminal law. One sees the
close link drawn between retribution and denunciation in her thought
when she explains that “[t]he moral code of any society finds some of its
expression in the criminal law”78 and that retribution serves the end of
expressing abhorrence at the breach of this moral code. Justice Southin
wrote that a judge is entitled to gauge the moral outrage that retribution
legitimately reflects not only by reference to the Criminal Code but also
by reference to the “thoughts, feelings, and attitudes of the rest of the
community.”79 In a resonant turn of phrase, she explained that retribution
as a component of criminal sentencing is a legitimate response to the
fact that “the community is outraged by mindless violence, especially
by mindless violence ending in death, and expects a killing to be expiated
by a substantial term of imprisonment.”80 By means of retribution, she
seems to be arguing, criminal punishment legitimately serves as a kind
of sacrificial atonement for the moral sins of the offender.81
But the weight of authority in the bcca stood against retribution
as a legitimate purpose of sentencing. The conceptual struggle for the
judges taking this position was to meaningfully distinguish this aim
from that of denunciation. This is clear in the 1992 judgment of Wood
J.A. in R. v. Hoyt.82 Justice Wood refers to and endorses the rejection
of retribution as a principle of sentencing in R. v. Hinch and Salanski,
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stating that none of the court’s jurisprudence could be said to have
retreated from that position. His stance against retribution is firm, and
he states that “there is no meaning theoretical or otherwise … which
can give retribution any role in a principled approach to sentencing.”83
He explains: “At best it is a concept which is incapable of any objective
standard of application. At worst it subverts the rule of law which, in a
civilized community, stands between the offender and the understandable
and quite natural instinct of revenge which arises both in the victim and
in all who identify with the victim.” In the case at hand, Justice Wood
read the sentencing judge’s reference to retribution as an “inadvertent
slip of the tongue”;84 the trial judge was, in Wood J.A.’s view, actually
invoking the legitimate purpose of denunciation. In Hicks,85 Lambert
J.A. underscored the legitimate role of denunciation but characterized the
distinction between denunciation and retribution as a matter of degree: “It
is when denunciation goes further and results in a sentence that is more
severe than is required in order to be proportionate to the gravity of the
offence that denunciation turns from an applicable sentencing principle
into retribution or revenge, neither of which is appropriate.”86
The contours of this engaging debate in the bcca are clear. Retribution is a problematic aim of sentencing that sits somewhere between
illegitimate vengeance and the accepted purpose of denunciation. For
those judges who accepted the role of retribution, it was but a rephrasing
and legitimate form of denunciation – the desire to express, through
criminal punishment, the moral disapprobation of the community. On
the other side, and reflecting the weight of authority from the bcca,
judges who rejected retribution distinguished it from denunciation
precisely in its slide to revenge.87
Although the bcca would ultimately reject retribution as a legitimate
component of our criminal justice system, in R. v. C.A.M., 88 the scc
disagreed. C.A.M. was a horrific case involving multiple counts of
egregious sexual violence. The sentencing judge had imposed a sentence
totalling twenty-five years, but a majority of the bcca reduced the
sentence by approximately seven years on the basis that this sentence
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offended the court’s general rule that consecutive sentences should not
exceed a total of 20 years in custody. In the course of his reasons, Justice
Wood also reiterated the position of the court that retribution is not a
legitimate goal of sentencing, referencing “[t]he fine line which separates
the legitimate denunciatory objective from its illegitimate retributive
cousin,”89 and he also referred to the practice in the United States,
under the banner of retribution, of imposing sentences totalling several
hundred years imprisonment, a practice that, to Justice Wood, “with
respect, can only be regarded as both absurd and uncivilized.”90 But the
scc overruled the bcca’s decision, restoring the sentence of twenty-five
years imprisonment. In the course of its reasons, the scc also held that
the Court of Appeal had erred in concluding that retribution is not a
legitimate principle of sentencing.
In the scc’s view, retribution “is an accepted, and indeed important,
principle of sentencing in our criminal law.”91 Chief Justice Lamer,
writing for the court, explained that “[r]etribution, as an objective of sentencing, represents nothing less than the hallowed principle that criminal
punishment, in addition to advancing utilitarian considerations related
to deterrence and rehabilitation, should also be imposed to sanction the
moral culpability of the offender.”92 Yet the Supreme Court did not follow
the path of the BC dissenters who would tie retribution to denunciation,
nor did it reject the concerns expressed by those BC justices who were
so very uneasy with its ready association with vengeance. Instead, the
scc explained that, unlike vengeance, which is “an uncalibrated act of
harm upon another, frequently motivated by emotion and anger, as a
reprisal for harm inflicted upon oneself by that person,” retribution
“represents an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an
appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of
the offender.”93 Yet retribution, the scc explains, is also distinct from
denunciation. Whereas denunciation is a symbolic expression of the
community’s condemnation of the conduct in question, retribution is
about properly reflecting the moral culpability of the offender.94
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One can take issue, as we would, with the distinctions drawn here
by the scc, particularly the extent to which emotion and reason, calibration and the seeking of harm, lie comfortably or stably on one side
of the vengeance/retribution division that the court draws. But for
present purposes, the most interesting dimension of this judicial debate
about retribution is that it highlights the bcca’s role in wrestling with
the ends of the criminal justice system, a task that has forced it – and
other appellate courts – to be expounders of social theory as much as
jurisprudence.
A Renewed Commitment to Rehabilitation
The failure and abandonment of the borstal-style reformatories in British
Columbia did not put an end to rehabilitative intentions in criminal
sentencing in the province. From 1975 onwards, the rehabilitative ethos
shifted to one that sought the use of non-custodial means of encouraging
the reformation and reintegration of the offender as a responsible and
safe member of society. Over these years the sentencing objective of
rehabilitation took on a strongly non-custodial connotation and, indeed,
became the principal counterweight against sentencing considerations,
such as deterrence and denunciation, that might lead to a punishment
involving incarceration. Alongside the scepticism about deterrence and
anxiety about retribution in the court’s jurisprudence over this period,
one finds by the 1990s a strong sense in the bcca’s sentencing jurisprudence that the harshness of punishment should, whenever possible,
bend to the imperative of rehabilitation.
In R. v. Preston,95 for example, the court wrestled with the relationship
between deterrence and rehabilitation in the context of an accused who
had been convicted of her twenty-fourth drug-related offence. Justice
Wood, who clearly played an important role in BC sentencing law
during this period, accepted that the overall goal of the criminal justice
system must be the protection of society and that if incarceration is the
only means by which this protection can be achieved, this option must
be used. However, writing for a panel of five, Wood J.A. reasoned that,
“where, as in this case, the danger to society results from the potential
of the addict to commit offences to support her habit, and it appears to
the court that there is a reasonable chance that she may succeed in an
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attempt to control her addiction, then it becomes necessary to consider
the ultimate benefit to society if that chance becomes a reality.”96 In
Justice Wood’s opinion, allowing for this chance not only offers the
possible permanent protection of society but may also avoid the costs
associated with the frequent incarceration of someone suffering from
an addiction. At a time when our jails are swelling with individuals
incarcerated for drug-related crimes, it is instructive to reflect back on
Justice Wood’s “grave doubts”97 that incarceration for possession holds
any hope for specific or general deterrence of addicted offenders. The
court speaks of “the ultimate futility of the short-term protection which
the community enjoys from a sentence of incarceration” and argues that,
in cases such as Preston, “the principle of deterrence should yield to any
reasonable chance of rehabilitation which may show itself to the court
imposing sentence.”98
Justice Taylor, writing in Pettigrew,99 came to a similar conclusion
with respect to the relationship between the goal of denunciation and
that of rehabilitation. Justice Taylor did not limit himself to minor or
drug-related offences. Indeed, as noted above, Pettigrew was a case of
manslaughter.100 Nevertheless, in this case that otherwise endorsed the
use of denunciation as a legitimate component of criminal sentencing,
the bcca stated that a key question in the imposition of a denunciatory
sentence had to be “whether any adverse effects which a denunciatory
punishment would have on the rehabilitation of the offender can be
justified in the overall interest of the protection and advancement of
society.”101
Yet the most vigorous defence of rehabilitation and the consequences of
the logic of rehabilitation on the use of incarceration came in Sweeney.102
Justice Wood, writing for himself and Chief Justice McEachern, stated
that “[i]t has long been recognized that rehabilitation, as a goal of the
sentencing process, cannot be achieved through the imposition of custodial sentences.”103 Given our heavy reliance upon incarceration, one
might be led by this statement to conclude that rehabilitation must be a
secondary or subsidiary goal of our justice system. Yet Wood J.A. drew
the opposite conclusion, placing rehabilitation at the core of the bcca’s
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theory of sentencing. Since “rehabilitation remains the only certain
way of permanently protecting society from a specific offender,”104 “if
the rehabilitation of a specific offender remains a reasonable possibility,
that is a circumstance which requires the sentencing court to consider
seriously a non-custodial form of disposition.”105 Justice Wood made clear
that this principle ought to apply to serious criminal offences, presenting
the possibility that a significant prospect of rehabilitation “may outweigh
the perceived general deterrent advantages of a custodial sentence.”106
None of this should suggest that, in the 1990s, the bcca was abandoning the use of custodial sentences. In cases where the protection of
the public could reasonably be achieved only through incarceration, the
court had no hesitation imposing carceral sentences.107 Yet in the early
1990s, the court was strongly advancing the notion of the parsimonious
use of incarceration on the principled basis that the protection of society
is better served by rehabilitated, rather than isolated, offenders.108 With
the passage of Bill C-41 in 1995, the Criminal Code reflected this view, articulating the principle that “an offender should not be deprived of liberty,
if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances”109
and that “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with
particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders”.110
Although these principles of restraint are sadly underutilized in
current sentencing practices, the bcca did play an important role in
the development of these principles in the context of the sentencing of
Aboriginal offenders in a case called R. v. Gladue.111 The case involved
an Aboriginal woman who pled guilty to manslaughter for killing her
common law husband in a drunken fit of jealousy. The sentencing judge
imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment, expressly refusing to
give weight to the accused’s Aboriginal status, as suggested by s. 718.2(e),
on the basis that the she was living off-reserve. The court unanimously
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rejected this interpretation of s. 718.2(e), although the majority of the
court, in reasons written by Justice Esson, concluded that the trial judge’s
sentence ought not to be interfered with. Justice Rowles dissented in the
result. She interpreted s. 718.2(e) as a parliamentary “recognition of the
principle of restraint in the use of incarceration in sentencing.”112 She
noted Canada’s comparatively high incarceration rate and emphasized
the tremendously disproportionate incarceration of Aboriginal peoples
in Canada, a fact referred to in innumerable public reports and scholarly
writings. “Overrepresentation of the magnitude found in the studies,”
Rowles J.A. found, “results, in part, from what is referred to as systemic
discrimination.”113 Justice Rowles read s. 718.2(e), which emphasizes the
attention that should be given to Aboriginal offenders, as an invitation for
the “recognition and amelioration of the impact systemic discrimination
has on aboriginal people,”114 a reflection of an emphasis on rehabilitation,
and an opening for a new form of rehabilitation that would take account
of the needs of the broader community – restorative justice. Although the
Supreme Court would not disturb the trial judge’s sentence in Gladue,115
the theory and interpretation of s. 718.2(e) offered by Justice Rowles was
very much adopted and amplified, opening new avenues – regrettably
not yet as robustly explored as we would hope – for an emphasis on
rehabilitative sentencing and restorative justice with special attention
to the unique history and circumstances of Aboriginal offenders and
communities.

CONCLUSION

The great constitutional scholar, advocate, and Canadian poet F.R.
Scott painted a challenging and provocative picture of the practices of
criminal punishment as he saw them in the mid-20th century:
III. Justice
This judge is busy sentencing criminals
Of whose upbringing and environment he is totally ignorant.
His qualifications, however, are the highest –
A B.A. degree,
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A technical training in Law,
Ten years practice at the Bar,
And membership in the right political party.
Who should know better than he
Just how many years in prison
Will reform a slum-product,
Or whether ten or twenty strokes of the lash
Will put an end to assaults on young girls?116

As much as it is a critique of institutional hubris in the infliction of
criminal punishment, Scott’s verse is also a call to attend to the theories
about the causes of crime, the nature of human conduct, and just social
responses to wrongdoing that invariably animate our criminal justice
system.
In this article we have explored the important role that the bcca
has played in wrestling with what constitutes a just social response to
criminal wrongdoing. The court’s work in this area has been rich, its
views on sentencing as mercurial as the practices of punishment. At
times the court has served quite directly as an institutional voice for
dominant social views of punishment, whether they were of a more
sternly retributive form or reflected an era of hope in rehabilitation. Yet,
in more recent years, the jurisprudence of the court has also included
strong voices expressing the kind of critical posture towards traditional
assumptions in our theories and practices of sentencing that Scott would
seem to commend.
Our current political climate finds a retributive ethos in the criminal
law in ascendancy. We use preventative detention more now than ever.
Recent governments have shown an appetite for more and harsher
minimum sentences. Our prisons swell with overuse. Yet we are no
safer as a result. In this context, the bcca will continue to serve as an
important institutional player in the ongoing debate about the just and
effective forms of criminal punishment. As it continues in its task of
wrestling with the competing constellations of sentencing objectives
in the criminal law, we hope that the court will also draw upon its
own tradition and continue to push us to think more deeply, critically,
and cautiously about the assumptions that tacitly guide our system of
criminal justice.
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